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Chapter 5 
A Retrospective on the Negative Income 
Tax Experiments: Looking Back at the 
Most Innovate Field Studies in Social 
Policy 
Robert A. Levine, Harold Watts, Robinson Hollister, Walter Williams, 
Alice O 'Connor, and Karl Widerquist 
Introduction, Karl Widerquist 
The United States government conducted four negative income tax (NIT) exper-
iments between 1968 and l 980. NIT is a form of basic income guarantee (BIG) 
that was popular in the 1960s and 1970s. It differs from basic income in that it 
gives money only to those with low incomes. However, both are basic income 
guarantees in the sense that they guarantee everyone a minimum income. Although 
the differences between the two policies are important, they have enough 
similarities so that what was learned from the NIT experiments can help us 
understand the consequences of either BTG plan. 
The experiments began under the direction of the Office of Economic Oppor-
tunity (OEO) near the end of the Johnson administration and continued within the 
Department of Health Education and Welfare (HEW) after the Nixon adminis-
tration abolished OEO. Their main goal was to determine the labor supply response 
to an income guarantee. That is, how much will work effort decline if a negative 
income tax is introduced? But as the experiments went on, many more questions 
were examined. The first experiments were conducted in New Jersey and 
Pennsylvania between 1968 and 1972, on a largely urban population of two-parent 
fam ilies. Two more experiments were soon added-one in Gary, Indiana to exa-
mine the effects of an N IT on single parents, and one in North Carolina and Iowa 
to examine its effects on rural populations. Finally the Seattle- Denver Income 
Maintenance Experiment (SIME- DIME) was added with a much larger experi-
mental population. 
These experiments were the first large scale social science experiment ever 
conducted, and they have become a model for social experiments. They employed 
the method (common in the natural sciences) of dividing subjects into a control 
group and an experimental group through random assignment. The experimental 
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group was given a negative income tax and the control group was not. Researchers 
collected income information and conducted interviews with both groups to 
determine how those receiving the NIT behaved compared to those not receiving it. 
The experiments eventual ly included thousands of subjects and collected data on 
variables such as time spent working (for all members of the fami ly), school 
attendance, health, and marital status. 
The experiment's results were widely discussed in policy circles and in the 
popular media at two times. In 1970, Nixon's modified version of the NIT, the 
Family Assistance Plan, was being debated in Congress. To help its policy cause, 
the administration pressed experimenters to release their findings long before they 
were ready to do so. While preliminary results showed very moderate reductions in 
labor supply due to work-incentive effects, Congressional opponents criticized the 
find ings as prematw-e. 
The results were again discussed in the late 1970s during hearings for Jimmy 
Carter's Program for Better Jobs and Income. The finding that the work disincen-
tive was not so large that it made the program unaffordable was overshadowed by 
two other findings. Although the experimenters expected to find some negative 
work incentive effects, and were pleased with how small they turned out to be, 
many newspapers repo1ted the results as if the very existence of such effects was a 
crushing blow to the idea. Also, a controversial finding that the negative income 
tax increased the divorce rate caused a furor against the policy both in Congress 
and the media. 
In the following years, hundreds of articles in books and scholarly journals 
debated the results of the NIT experiments. For a critical review and extensive bib-
liography, see Widerquist (2005). 
In February 2002, the First Congress of the U.S. Basic Income Guarantee Net-
work brought together four of the original experimenters and one historian to dis-
cuss the meaning of the experiments today. The session moderator was Robert 
Harris, former executive director of the President's Commission on Income Main-
tenance, and former vice president of the Urban Institute. The speakers were 
Robert Levine, senior economic consultant of the Rand Corporation and author of 
The Poor Ye Need N ot Have With You: Lessons From the War on Poverty; 
Robinson Hollister, professor of economics at Swaithmore College and coauthor of 
Labor Market Policy and Unemployment Insurance; Harold Watts, emeritus pro-
fessor of economics and public affairs at Columbia University, former director of 
the Institute for Research on Poverty, and coeditor of The New Jersey Income 
Maintenance Experiment, Volumes II and ill; Walter Williams, emeritus professor 
of public affairs at the University of Washington, author of Honest Numbers and 
Democracy: Social Policy Analysis in the White House, Congress, and the Federal 
Agencies; and Alice O'Connor, associate professor of histo1y at the University of 
California- Santa Barbara, author of Poverty Knowledge: Social Science, Social 
Policy and the Poor in Twentieth Century U.S. Histo,y . What follows is taken from 
their remarks. 
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The Political Background of the Experiments, Robert Levine 
In the nineteenth century, economists were engaged in a great controversy over 
whether something called "value" was determined by supply or demand. Around 
the turn of the century some brilliant mind said "Why don't we substitute ' and' for 
' or,' and make it 'supply and demand'?" The discussion today about jobs guaran-
tees or income guarantees reminds me of that. The first formal proposal for a 
negative income tax (NIT) by the United States government was made in the five-
year antipoverty plan of 1965. NIT was very quickly thought to be in conflict with 
a job guarantee. But the question of full employment or basic income guarantee 
strikes me as a non-argument. That was the way some of us thought of it then, and 
I still think that was the right way to think of it. But the negative income tax 
experiment came out of that debate. 
Part of the political context is well known, at least in our esoteric circles. Alice 
O'Connor quoted me in her book as saying that when we brought the idea of a NIT 
to the high command of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), the director 
of congressional relations said "that won' t be an experiment in negative income 
tax, that will be an experiment on how to kill a program on the Hill." Sargent 
Shriver, to his credit, dismissed that, even though he was a politician to his finger-
tips. He said, "No, this is important, this is interesting, and we will go ahead with 
it." That was the political birth of the experiments that we're still discussing more 
than 30 years later. 
Some of the political background to the NIT in OEO has not been commonly 
known. Because the money for the experiment was to be taken from the Com-
munity Action Demonstration Program (which had existed from the beginning of 
OEO in 1965), there was a substantial sum of tens of millions of dollars avai lable. 
Some of the more controversial demonstration programs were in Chicago and 
Mississippi and a lot of the money was used to fund programs that were considered 
not just intellectually, but politically, radical; and they caused OEO much trouble 
at the time. Basically the accusation was made that the govenun ent was fund ing 
political power. 
Then, we came in; we were the reactionary economists who wanted to do 
something else. Before I became assistant director of OEO, I was in charge of the 
division of research and planning. Robinson Hollister succeeded me, Walter 
Williams succeeded Rob. The only reason Harold Watts wasn' t in the sequence is 
that he went back to Wisconsin before we could catch him. We wanted to try 
science to find out something very specific. My colleagues will describe the 
specifics, but we believed that the basic political obstacle to anything like a 
negative income tax was the widespread belief that it would kill work incentives. 
We set out not to prove that it would not, but to find out whether it would. That 
was the very narrow, scientific focus of the experiment. 
We set control groups to get information on that particular topic, not to prove 
anything to support an agenda. Community action people attacked from the left 
and congressional people attacked from the right. Those attacking from the left 
believed in " the culture of poverty" and didn' t think income had much to do with 
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why people were poor. Those on the right didn't !mow why we wanted to get this 
information since the program was impossible anyhow. With Sh.river's aid, we got 
through these obstacles. 
After Nixon's election in 1968, it was generally felt within OEO that he was 
going to kill the poverty program when he took over from Johnson. He didn't; he 
appointed a new head of the program named Don Rumsfeld who brought in an 
assistant named Dick Cheney. Rumsfeld systematically invited OEO folks to talk 
to him in his congressional office. My impression was that he attempted to pre-
serve the program by shifting it in a Republican direction-experimentation rather 
than action. This put a focus on the NIT experiment. 
The Makeup of the Experiments, Harold Watts 
I understand that Sargent Sh.river said "We've got this institute up in Wisconsin 
and they aren't good for anything else, so why don't we have them experiment?". 
We took that as a serious recommendation. We took very seriously the question of 
whether a set of programs would produce a generation of layabouts. That was the 
hypothesis that needed to be examined. If you 're worried about the layabout possi-
bility, you really want to start out with people who are working. And so the first 
experiment did not look at the welfare population but at the working poor. 
A negative income tax can be looked at as having two parts-a lump-sum grant 
(G) and a reduced wage (Y-tY). From the standpoint of static economic theory, 
both of those things should reduce the tendency to work. The lump sw11 grant 
should produce more leisure and more non-wage work. The reduced price of 
leisure, which comes from the reduced wage, should also produce more leisure: 
"Time off is cheaper, let's buy some more of that." There was no question of the 
direction of the effect of NIT on hours worked, and there was no lack of confmna-
tion of that in the experiments. But the question was quantitative: How much 
would NIT reduce work time? The same theory that says that people would defi-
nitely be inclined to work less also says that they are made better off, because the 
NIT expands the alternatives available to them. This was confirmed because 
almost no one refused to take part in the program. That part of economic theory 
works fine. 
But do we need an experiment to answer these questions? There are different 
people at various levels of unearned income and different levels of net wage 
running around loose in the streets. Why don't we just see what they do? The 
experimental problem with using these people is that nothing is imposed from the 
outside; there is no exogenous change. The experiment tried to make the change in 
income and net wage rate exogenous, so that the behavior of recipients would be 
representative of a national program. 
The size of the work response was important, because if work effort declined 
sufficiently it would largely vitiate the strategy of using the NIT as a means of 
increasing family income. If recipients used their entire NIT to buy more leisure, it 
succeeds in making them better off, but it wouldn't be a good antipoverty program. 
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I want to emphasize a couple of ways the experiment tended to maximize the 
size of the work-effort response. First, we applied no additional treatments that 
would tend to prod them into the labor market. We had to check what they earned 
to determine how much to pay them, but we weren't critical if they didn't work. 
Second, it was a short-term experiment. In our case, essentially leisure was on sale 
for a three-year period. When laundry soap is on sale, what do you do? You buy a 
lot of it. You might expect people in the experiment to act the same way. Not 
everyone will; someone who has a good job (it may not pay much, but it's stable) 
may not want to mess arotmd with that by working less. That kind of rigidity could 
be built into their job. But by and large the poor families we were looking at didn't 
tend to have terribly steady jobs. There were a few with stable janitor jobs at 
Princeton, but for the most part, that wasn't the case, and there was a disincentive. 
People did work less, but percentage-wise it tended to be in the single digits for 
men in particular. Some of the work response came from taking more time to look 
for work. Some of it came from cutting down hours, say from 65 to 60 hours a 
week, which doesn't seem like a tragedy. I don't remember finding anyone (on an 
anecdotal basis), who as soon as they got the grant, left the labor market and sat on 
the porch and whittled for three years. 
That's what we found and those are the tools we used to find it. The whole 
flavor of the OEO at that point was something rather new to the government: a 
willingness to look at evidence, to do some examination, to check some facts out. 
That hadn't always been there, and in that sense, this idea of doing some experi-
mentation fell on fertile ground. 
The Findings of the Experiments, Robinson Hollister 
My part of this discussion covers three points. First, I review the results of the 
experiments with respect to the labor supply, which was the central issue driving 
the design of all these experiments. Second, I talk about the non-labor supply 
outcomes that have largely been ignored and that covered a territory that was ahead 
of its time in many ways. These bear heavily on what other benefits come from 
having a basic income guarantee. Third, I map the findings of the experiments to 
what we have found since then. 
Labor supply results showed about a I 3 percent reduction of work effort for the 
family as a whole starting from an initial work effort of 3 5 hours per week for the 
entire family. One-third of the response came from the primary earner, one-third 
from the secondary earner, and one-third from the tertiary earner in the family. In 
most cases, the primary earner worked more hours than the secondary and tertiary 
earners, and therefore, when measured in percentage terms, there were relatively 
small responses from the primary earner. Percentage term responses were much 
bigger from the female spouses in the family and from the third workers in the 
families. The biggest response overall came in reduction in the female labor supply 
and that mostly took the form of slower reentry to the labor market after absence. 
This labor supply response added about 25 percent to the static costs of a national 
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program with a guarantee level approximately at the poverty line. You could look 
at these results as either half empty or half full. You could say that 25 percent is 
too much or not too much. 
The most common non-labor supply result mentioned was an erroneous finding 
by some sociologists (from an initial analysis of the Seattle- Denver Income 
Maintenance Experiments) that the marriage-dissolution rate for black families in 
the experimental groups was 57 percent greater than the control group, and 53 
percent greater for white families. When these results came out in congressional 
hearings, Senator Moynihan, who had been a backer of Nixon's Family Assistance 
Plan, and who had written a very controversial report about instability in the black 
family, recanted his support for the guaranteed income. Those particular findings 
greatly contributed to killing the Ca1ter administration's guaranteed income 
scheme. In the 1980s, Glen Cain carefully reanalyzed the data from the Seattle-
Denver experiment. The results were technically quite complicated, but there was 
basically no family dissolution effect. Some of the results were suspect from the 
beginning, because the effect seemed to occur in the sector of people with the 
lowest guarantee rate, the lowest incentive to strike out on their own-those who 
had the least to gain from breaking up showed the largest amount of marital 
breakup. Cain's study appeared in the American Journal of Sociology in 1990, with 
a rebuttal by the authors of the original findings, but subsequent studies (and those 
from the other NIT experiments) also found no effects on marital stability. 
The rural experiment in North Carolina and Iowa collected data on educational 
attainment. In North Carolina there were significant positive influences in grades 
2-8 in attendance rates and teacher rating, and on test scores. The literature on 
education shows that it is nearly impossible to raise test scores through direct inter-
vention. Yet, BIG had large positive effects on the test scores of children in the 
worst-off families in the rural South. The New Jersey experiment didn't collect 
data on test scores, but there was a very significant effect on school continuation; 
that is, BIG was an effective anti-dropout program. Again, if you look at programs 
that are trying to reduce dropouts directly, it's a pretty dismal scene. In Gary, there 
were positive test score effects for males in grades 4-6. In Seattle- Denver, there 
was a positive effect on adults going on in continuing education. 
Some of the experiments collected data on low birth weight, nutrition, and 
other quality-of-life variables. Low birth weight is associated with very serious 
deficits later on in life, and programs that try to reduce the incidence of low birth 
weight have been largely ineffective; but the Gary experiment found that NIT 
reduced low birth rates in the most at-risk categories. The rural experiment showed 
significant effects in various categories of nutritional adequacy. Homeownership 
showed significant effects in New Jersey, in the rural experiment, and in the first 
year of the Gary experiment. 
It is important to map these results into more recent experience, both ex-
perimental and non-experimental. Later experiments such as the Minnesota work-
welfare reform (MFIP), SSP in Canada, and New Hope in Milwaukee tended to be 
work related with strong financial incentives. People who wanted to get benefits 
had to work a minimum of hours and, as you would expect, these experimental 
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programs elicited greater work effort. But across all the experiments, secondary 
earners used some of the benefits to buy more time in the home. Non-experimental 
studies using income tax retmns also found effects similar to the NIT. Two-parent 
families receiving an Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) used some of the extra 
income to increase time at home; this was especially true for secondary earners. 
The order of magnitude of the labor supply elasticity is essentially the same in 
more recent experiments. The Minnesota experiment found positive effects for 
marital stability and reduced domestic abuse. The Canadian experiment found an 
increase in marital stability in New Brunswick and a decrease in marital stability in 
British Columbia. The New Hope experiment found some long-term effects on the 
educational performance of males (in the experimental group) in elementary 
school. 
The Use and Misuse of Experimental Information, Walter Williams 
I' m greatly concerned about the growing misuse of policy information in the cur-
rent political environment. Elliot Richardson ( 1980: I 05), a distinguished secretary 
of several United States government departments wrote, "in a sense, all of the 
abuses of Watergate have been abuses of information: its theft, distortion, misuse, 
fabrication, misrepresentation, concealment and suppression." Today's efforts are 
not new, but these activities, with the exception of theft, are much worse today 
than in earlier times. And the growing abuses of information undermine informed 
consent by the people and ultimately American democracy itself. 
I will argue that the negative income tax experiment set a standard in seeking 
reliable information, which should be current practice, and that the Office of 
Economic Opportunity (OEO) policy analysis staff of which I was a member 
exemplified sound analytic practices. This did not come about because the analysts 
involved had greater personal integrity than current practitioners, but because the 
political environment faci litated such efforts. It is the deterioration of political 
institutions that is the problem, not the skills and standards of today' s policy ana-
lysts and researchers. 
The policy analysts at OEO were not public relations types but academically 
oriented social scientists. They understood that thefr one comparative advantage 
was to go after hard evidence on the negative income tax. It is true that the OEO 
analytic staff hoped that fam ilies receiving negative income tax payments would 
not significantly reduce thefr work efforts. However, and this is critical, they 
sought a carefully designed state-of-the-art field experiment to provide a rigorous 
assessment of the extent to which negative income tax payment recipients changed 
the labor supply response. And the social scientists at the University of Wisconsin 
at Madison who were administering the study were even more concerned about 
meeting the highest research standards. 
The OEO analytic unit had a basic c01ru11itment to increasing the supply of 
sound, relevant social policy information and undertook an extensive research 
program to develop it. For example, the analytic unit set up and fully funded the 
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University of Wisconsin ' s Institute for Research on Poverty, and supp01ted in its 
initial stage a critically important longitudinal study at the University of Michigan 
following 5,000 American families and that has continued for 35 years. OEO 
launched the first major, rigorous social policy evaluations and large-scale field 
experiments. As to the latter, the New Jersey negative income tax experiment was 
funded largely because the OEO analytic office, in summer of 1965, sold agency 
director Sargent Shriver on a negative income tax plan, and he recommended it to 
the president in that year 's agency submission to the budget bureau. Then in 
October 1965, the office sent the budget office a more detailed, more accurate esti-
mate for the cost of a negative income tax aimed at ending poverty by 1976- the 
200th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence. 
The United States has experienced a radical change in the political environment 
since the 1965- 1968 period. During that period, the OEO analytic staff could 
engage in sound analyses of the pros and cons of policy options to supp01t agency 
decision-making. The commitment to good information at OEO ce1tainly did not 
run throughout the government. But, between then and now, the changes that have 
come about have been negative. Although emphasis on sound data remains essen-
tial for reasoned policymaking, I have found over the years that there is more and 
more disto1tion of information and policy analyses. Over time, the willful use of 
deceptive statistics and misleading analyses has increased materially, with the 
current administration using disto1ted evidence as its main weapon in misleading 
the public about its major policies. 
Our political system has been deteriorating because people in senior positions, 
including the highest officials in the White House and Congress, have been propa-
gandizing citizens who often do not perceive the nature and extent of the subter-
fuge. Take President George W. Bush's 2001 tax bill, where the top one percent of 
the income distribution got thuty percent of the tax cuts and the bottom forty 
percent got only about fifteen percent. Yet, the Bush administration was able to 
pass the tax legislation by engaging in an extended propaganda campaign claiming 
falsely that those at the bottom benefited the most. 
The overriding problem is that the public is fed distorted information and false 
assertions based on it; yet, the politicians lack either the political will or the 
institutional capacity to restore integrity to national politics. As I observed in 
Reaganism and the Death of Representative Democracy, "The extent to which 
deceptive propaganda has been employed in [President George W.] Bush's first 
three years to sell major policy proposals makes the Bush administration radically 
different from any earlier presidency" (Williams 2003: 259). Ultimately, the issue 
is whether the public receives sound policy information and interpretation- prior 
to the making of major public decisions-for there to be informed consent. If not, 
democracy withers. Policy analysts are accused of aggrandizing the importance of 
valid information so let me turn finally to an impeccable source, James Madison, 
the father of the Constitution: "The people who mean to be their own Governors 
must arm themselves with the power knowledge gives" (Hunt 1910: 103). In sum, 
American democracy requires the informed consent of the people on major policy 
choices; and such informed consent can come only when the needed relevant 
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policy information is available to citizens in time for them to consider the policy at 
issue and assent to it. 
Political Ramifications of the Experiments, Alice O'Connor 
The period we're talking about seems like ancient history; not only is there now 
less integrity in the inquiries behind policy changes, but also antipoverty is now 
easily dismissed as a serious policy objective. Sometimes when I tell my students 
that Lyndon B. Johnson made speeches about ending poverty in America, they 
laugh. That to me is extraordinarily sad commentary. 
The NIT experiments were not just fundamentally scientific undertakings, but 
fundamentally political undertakings as well. Within a broader political context, 
we need to understand them as experiments whose design, implementation, and 
ultimately whose meaning, were all shaped by the volatile and rapidly changing 
politics of social provision, social welfare, and social citizenship. We can also see 
the experiments as a form of political advocacy- they sought to establish the 
legitimacy of the NIT in the absence of widespread political awareness or support. 
As a scientific unde1taking, the experiments were highly successful, but as a 
political undertaking the experiments had the opposite effect. They were used to 
undermine the NIT/BIG concept. More importantly, they show us some of the 
fundamental weaknesses of framing the BIG idea narrowly, as a highly targeted 
antipoverty measme as opposed to a more universal citizenship right, framing it as 
policy with labor-market effects as opposed to an intervention that actively tries to 
reshape labor markets. I also want to discuss what the experiments tell us about the 
limitations of a style of policy making that looks to these experiments as a source 
of policy innovation. 
The politics at the time affected the experiments. The guaranteed income was 
talked about in the late I 960s as an idea whose time had come, but there was no 
significant mobilization in tenns of any grassroots or major constituency groups 
like labor behind the idea. Instead, guaranteed income came to the fore with 
extremely diverse advocates. There was a group of free market economists who 
saw it as an antidote to the bmgeoning welfare state. Some in the civil rights 
movement and the growing welfare rights movement ta lked about the NIT as a 
response to the problems of structural unemployment in the labor market (as well 
as to racism in the labor market and gender bias in the labor market), and activists 
attached it to an expanded notion of citizenship rights. Most important of all in 
terms of getting these experiments going were the Keynesian economists within 
the Johnson administration, specifically within OEO, who came to embrace the 
negative income tax as a key to eliminating pove1iy by 1976 as laid out in the five-
year plan developed by OEO analysts. This group saw the income guarantee as a 
supplement to the overriding full employment growth strategy embraced in the war 
on poverty. 
The experimenters were determined not to advocate something that would vio-
late the basic principles ofa market economy. That is to say, they didn't insist that 
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BIG was a response to market failure so much as to the incapacity of certain 
segments of people in the labor market to earn adequate wages. The experiments, 
therefore, were concerned with proving N1T's efficacy as a tool for raising 
incomes above the poverty line, and to prove the hunch (that had been based on 
some econometric studies) that the NIT could eliminate poverty without a massive 
work disincentive and within the boundaries of liberal social policies at the time. 
Those who held this view saw the NIT as emphasizing growth over redistribution. 
They were reluctant to regulate labor markets explicitly, and considered the 
antipoverty measures not to be about changing the dynamics of inequality, but 
about expanding opportunities to be part of the economic system. As a result, the 
experiments were highly targeted. They focused on the poorest people (up to 150 
percent of the pove1ty line), not a broad segment of the population. They were not 
concerned with some of the broader labor market effects such as how a basic 
income guarantee affects the choice and power of workers to go elsewhere, and did 
not attempt to look at the impact on racial or gender segmentation of the labor 
market. These problems were not acknowledged within the framework of these 
experiments. This leads me to say that the experiments were narrowly focused on 
individual behavior and predicting it, not on the structural impact of the NIT. 
Another kind of politics that shaped the experiments was the politics of social 
provision for poor people. From the standpoint of the economists who designed the 
experiments, one of the appeals of income guarantees was that they were efficient 
and would cut through some of the inefficiencies of the Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children ("welfare") program, and especially would be fairer to the 
working poor because they wouldn't be targeted to women with children. This led 
to a political decision in the New Jersey experiment to focus on two-parent, male-
breadwinner families, assuming that welfare mothers (and their potential work 
falloff) wouldn' t be a major political issue at the time. (This despite the fact that in 
1967 Congress passed the WIN "work incentives" legislation that tried to put more 
welfare recipients to work.) Similarly, the assumption was that the potential work 
falloff among wives in two-parent families would not become a political issue. In 
fact, however, Nixon later played very heavily on the two-parent/single-parent 
divide in promoting his family assistance plan and in his more dedicated efforts to 
break up the political coalition behind the Great Society. By pitching his p lan as a 
matter of fairness for the forgotten two-parent families who were ineligible for 
welfare, he drew a sharp, artificial distinction between the popular, stereotypically 
white, two-parent working poor/working-class family, on the one hand, and the 
"welfare poor" on the other hand, who were increasingly imagined in the public 
mind as predominantly black, drug using, etc.- none of which was true. 
These divisive, racial politics quickly came to determine the political meaning 
of these experiments. They became political fodder in the Nixon-era wars over 
welfare reform. At first, it actually looked like this was going to be a moment of 
congruence between research and political priorities: Nixon's Family Assistance 
Plan (F AP), after all, was a version of the NIT with a work requirement attached. 
Before the results were in, they were able, under extreme pressure from White 
House advisor Daniel P. Moynihan, to put together a report that was used in 
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testimony in favor of FAP, saying there were no work disincentive effects 
whatsoever. 
The moment of congruence quickly passed, however. The use of the 
experiments in favor ofFAP drew public and political attention to the experiments. 
And Senator Williams from New Jersey, an opponent of FAP, used this as an 
occasion to sic the General Accounting Office on the experiment, claiming that the 
families were double-dipping and should be prosecuted for welfare fraud. He tried 
to get Congress to invade the office of the experiments and look into the files of 
the experimental families. David Kershaw, who was running the experiments, 
essentially camped out to prevent congressional investigators from ruining the 
confidentiality agreement with the families. Thus, after looking like there was 
some congruence between social science and politics, as the war on welfare turned 
into a war on dependency, the findings of these experiments were actually used to 
undermine the very idea of an income guarantee. As others on the panel have 
indicated, the initial rosy scenario from the experiments changed once the longer-
range results were in: there was, after all, some measw-able work disincentive from 
the guaranteed income, albeit relatively modest and partly due to reduced hours 
among secondary as well as primary household earners. There were also the 
subsequently challenged findings linking the NIT to family breakup. By the late 
1970s, when the Carter administration attempted to revive a version of the NIT, 
even some of its former advocates turned against it. Moynihan, in a very public 
and I can' t help but think, strategically timed manner, said to Congress, "I am 
shocked to look at these findings and say we scientists were wrong." Meanwhile, 
the right wing mobil ized, in the form of Charles Murray and others, to use these 
findings to say that these experiments proved that an income guarantee was 
impossible. 
A final political dimension to the NIT experiments is that they were considered 
highly innovative, not just because they were testing this "idea whose time had 
come," but also because they represented a new approach to policy making. It was 
thought that an experimental design would give definitive proof that an idea can 
work. I think it led to consequences that were unanticipated. The experiments 
ushered in a time of increasing rigor, increasing emphasis on experimental design 
in program planning and evaluation, but they also helped raise the bar especially 
for innovative antipoverty policies, which now had to prove their value before 
passage. Antipoverty and welfare policy has been subjected to a scrutiny that is not 
applied to other areas of social policy, certainly not to military policy even though 
the military costs far more. 
To conclude, looking at the NIT experiments as a political undertaking shows 
us how politics can confound efforts to inform policy with scientific knowledge. 
Even as social scientists were sorting through and debating the meaning of the 
experimental findings, political opponents were using those findings to tell a 
simple story of lazy poor people and fam ily decline. I would point to the 
importance of using the experimental findings to tell a different story, and the 
importance of working harder to change th is prevailing narrative with a more com-
plex alternative. And yet, those of us who know better have let the simpler 
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narrative rule the day. This also points to the limitations of narrow antipoverty 
justifications for an income guarantee. The experiments, like the welfare reform 
debate that followed and distorted their meaning, turn on the individual behavior of 
poor people; and when we frame this as a behavioral issue, we rarely get the out-
come that progressives want. Finally, I think the experiments point to the political 
limitations of a style of policy making that doesn' t pay enough attention to the 
need to articulate research with the needs of social movements at the same time. 
Note 
* Special thanks to Robert Harris who moderated the session on which this chapter is based 
and gave extensive comments on the written version. 
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